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“The best job I ever had.”2

Courts speak candidly about these hurdles and risks. The 5th
Circuit, for example, likens judges to “sophisticated uninitiates”
when they grapple with adversary submissions whose technical
jargon escapes their understanding.7 “It is unhelpful,” says a
federal district court, “when attorneys write briefs that presuppose
specialized knowledge on the part of their readers.”8
“Dropping a judge in the middle of an alien landscape without
a map and expecting him to get his bearings from fragments of
testimony couched in occupational jargon to which he has not
previously been exposed,” concludes another federal district
court, “is not conducive to informed decisionmaking.”9 Yet
another federal district court puts it more bluntly:
Briefs “densely written and filled with technical
jargon and unexplained . . . terms of art . . .
increase the likelihood of misunderstanding and
outright error.”10

After decades of public service in all three branches of
government, that is how congressman, federal D.C. circuit judge,
White House counsel, law professor, and Presidential Medal of
Freedom recipient Abner J. Mikva recalled his judicial clerkship
with Justice Sherman Minton, his first position after law school.
Usually for a formal year or two, but frequently with informal
permanence fortified by lifelong mutual respect, the judge
remains the law clerk’s true professional mentor. Retired Admiral
James G. Stavridis is right: “True instinctive
mentors take the responsibility of mentorship
seriously and go about it in a systematic and
organized way.”3 True mentorship stands the test
of time.
Clerking is a privilege. Fresh out of law school
A “Symbiotic Relationship”
and eager to begin their careers, law clerks at any
Two federal district courts acknowledge that
level of the federal or state judiciary covet the
judges maintain a “symbiotic relationship”11 with the
opportunity to learn from a judge’s reservoir of
advocates, who “educate the Court”12 with robust
knowledge. But law clerks who anticipate careers
argument tailored to the judge’s circumstances.
writing as advocates are also well-positioned to
Symbiosis and tailoring mean that advocates convey
learn about something that a judge may not know
no weakness or disrespect when they write about
when briefs or other adversary submissions land on
the facts and law in a professional tone using, as
the desk.
Douglas E. Abrams one federal district judge recommends, language
That “something” concerns jargon, this article’s
“intelligible to everyday speakers of English.”13
focus because its use by advocates can impede the
In his latest book, retired 7th Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner
court’s understanding of a case’s facts and law.4 “Jargon” refers
confides that “judges do not feel patronized, or condescended to,
to “special words or expressions that are used by a particular
when a lawyer explains in words of one syllable some scientific,
profession or group and are difficult for others to understand.”5
technological, or other arcane feature of a case that is necessary to
Given the sheer complexity of much contemporary federal and
a full understanding. . . . The judges are happy to be educated by
state litigation, judges sometimes find themselves in the “others”
the lawyers in the intricacies of a case.”14 Plain English remains an
category.
indispensable vehicle for fulfilling this educative role.
“Alien Landscapes”
To specialists who frequently write to other specialists, jargon
may come naturally even when non-specialists comprise the
audience. Resort to jargon may also seem a convenient shortcut,
supplanting the need for fuller explanation. Like many seeming
shortcuts, however, an advocate’s use of jargon in briefs and other
written submissions can end up exacting a heavy price. Jargon can
strew hurdles along the path to comprehension that advocates
should pave for the court.6 The advocate (and the client) risk
sacrificing an opportunity to persuade, and may also risk having to
spend valuable time fielding avoidable questions during a hearing
or oral argument.

Generalist Judges
Jargon might serve a legal writer’s purpose, or at least might
not detract much from it, when the audience consists solely of
readers who are trained in the writer’s specialty. But without this
foundation of common understanding, says Judge Posner, “much
legal jargon . . . can obscure rather than illuminate a particular
case.”15
“There is nothing wrong with a specialized vocabulary — for use
by specialists,” he explains. “Federal district and circuit judges,
however, . . . are generalists. . . . Lawyers should understand the
judges’ limited knowledge of specialized fields and choose their
vocabulary accordingly.”16
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Judge Posner explains that “[i]ndividual judges often have
specialized knowledge of a few fields of law, most commonly
criminal law and sentencing, civil and criminal procedure, and
federal jurisdiction, because these fields generate issues that
frequently recur, but sometimes of other fields as well depending
on the judge’s career before he became a judge or on special
interests developed by him since.”17 These specialization limits, he
adds, mean that an advocate “must not count on appellate judges’
being intimate with his particular legal nook — with its special
jargon. . . .”18
Judge Posner’s antidote for advocates whose jargon risks
thwarting effective communication with the court? “Every esoteric
term . . . has a counterpart in ordinary English.”19
In New Medium LLC v. Barco N.V., Judge Posner reinforced
his dictum about “ordinary English.”20 Sitting by designation as a
trial judge in a complex patent case, he instructed counsel that
“[a]ll submissions must be brief and non-technical and eschew
patent-law jargon. Since I am neither an electrical engineer nor
a patent lawyer, and since this case will be tried to a jury, . . .
the parties’ lawyers must translate technical and legal jargon into
ordinary language.”21
Administrative Review
Because administrative rules and regulations often weave
tangled doctrinal webs, the 5th Circuit specifies that jargon
warrants an advocate’s close attention when the court reviews an
agency decision. The court warns that with the passage of time,
agency administrators may acquire “insights and experience
denied judges. The subtleties . . . encased in jargon and tucked
into interstices of the administrative scheme, may escape us.”22
“It is the responsibilities of the parties to properly educate
the court,” adds a federal magistrate judge, “not of the court to
improperly defer to an agency decision.”23
Conclusion: Persuading and Assisting the Court
After grappling with the parties’ jargon-laden briefs a few years
ago, one judge issued this warning: “If in the future, a party’s
briefs are as difficult to follow as these, the court may ask the party
to rewrite the briefs.”24
Warning or no, the advocate is “a representative of clients [and]
an officer of the legal system” under the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.25 Counsel fulfill these roles most skillfully
with advocacy that heeds the dual aims that retired Judge Hugh
R. Jones of the New York Court of Appeals identified on this
Journal’s pages a generation ago. “First you seek to persuade
the court of the merit of the client’s case, to create an emotional
empathy for your position. Then you assist the court to reach a
conclusion favorable to the client’s interest in terms of the analysis
of the law and the procedural posture of the case.”26
Because oral argument in trial courts and appellate courts may
be limited or eliminated, persuasion and assistance may depend
heavily or entirely on the advocates’ written submissions. Skilled
advocates reach generalist judges most effectively with forceful
exposition of fact and law, free of undefined jargon and marked
by the quartet that characterizes quality legal writing — precision,
conciseness, simplicity, and clarity.27
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